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THE NEW YORK MORTGAGE MORATORIUM
STATUTE
T HE current economic asthenia has focused anew the
attention of lawyers and legislators on a problem that
troubled the nation during its early infancy.' Dissatisfaction
with the widespread relief of debtors at the expense of credi-
tors gave rise to the inclusion of the contracts clause 2 in the
Federal Constitution.3 This limitation on the power of the
states has, during the ensuing periods of business depression,
proved a generally effective bar to moratory legislation.4
Recently, however, the Supreme Court of the United States
has indicated a changed attitude.5 Whether, should the ques-
tion arise, this will lead ultimately to the approval of the
New York statute 6 is the problem with which we are here
primarily concerned.7
JUDICIAL RELIEF IN THE ABSENCE OF STATUTE.
In the absence of legislative intervention the mortgagor
turning to the courts for relief could hope for little more
than expressions of sympathy. Depressed land values is not
a sufficient ground for enjoining a foreclosure sale at the
1 Ogden v. Saunders, 7 U. S. 132, 214 (1827) ; 1 BEARD, RISE OF AMERICAN
CIVILIZATION (1927) 303-306, 327-328.2 U. S. CON sT. Art I, §10.
'Feller, Moratory Legislation; A Comparative Study (1933) 46 HARV.
L. REV. 1061, 1067.
'Id. at 1081-1085. An 1812 stay law was held unconstitutional in Jones v.
Crittenden, 4 N. C. 55, 1 Car. L. Rep. 385 (1814). During the Civil War period
the difficulty became acute, but the decisions were clearly against the validity of
such laws. Garlington v. Priest, 13 Fla. 559 (1870); Halloway v. Sherman,
12 Iowa 282, 79 Am. Dec. 537 (1861) ; Coffman v. Banhof, Ky., 40 Mo. 29, 90
Am. Dec. 311 (1866); Barnes v. Barnes, 53 N. C. 366 (1861); Jacobs v.
Smallwood, 63 N. C. 112 (1869); Johnson v. Winslow, 64 N. C. 27 (1870);
Wood v. Wood, 14 Rich. 148 (S. C. 1867); Earle v. Johnson, 31 Tex. 164
(1868) ; Taylor v. Stearns et al., 18 Gratt. 244 (Va. '1868). Contra: Stone v.
Basset, 4 Minn. 298, 4 G. 215 (1860); Farnsworth & Reaves v. Vance &
Fleming, 2 Cald. 108 (Tenn. 1865).
r Blaisdell v. Home Building & Loan Assn., 290 U. S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct. 231
(1934).6 N. Y. C. P. A. (1933) §§1077 a-g, 1083 a, b.
" While the New York statute is the basis of this paper, certain more
general subjects are discussed which render more intelligible the main theme.
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request of the debtor.8 Similarly, such aid has been denied
an unsecured creditor of the mortgagor who feared that dis-
posal of the property at existing prices would leave nothing
for his protection.9 Prevailing financial hardship will like-
wise furnish by itself no basis for a suit to set aside or a
motion to refuse to confirm a sale.10 While these results are
usually rested on a lack of power, only one court has gone so
far as to suggest that the restriction is constitutional." But
the tribunal was overzealous in rationalizing its decision, for
the contracts clause has no application to impairment by
judicial pronouncement."2 It should be noted that if other
grounds for relief exist, inadequacy of price may then be
considered in withholding confirmation. 13  The verbal appli-
cation of this rule in many cases where the decreased value
of the land is the sole determining element is not unlikely. 4
This is especially true in the light of indications, in the form
' Bolich v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 202 N. C. 789, 164 S. E. 335
(1932) ; Floore v. Morgan, 175 S. W. 737 (Tex. 1915) ; Muller v. Bayly, et al.,
62 Va. 521, 21 Gratt. 521 (1871); Capterton, Adm'r v. Landcraft, 3 W. Va.
540 (1869).
' Commonwealth Bank and Trust Co. v. MacDonnell, 49 S. W. (2) 525
(Tex. 1932).
" Hanan v. Threadgill, et at., 296 Fed. 569 (S. D. Fla. 1924); Southern
Grocery Co. v. Merchants' & Planters' Title & Investment Co., 186 Ark. 615,
54 S. W. (2) 980 (1932) ; Robertson v. Mathews, 200 N. C. 241, 156 S. E. 496
(1931) ; Dunlop v. Chenoweth, 90 N. J. Eq. 85, 105 Atl. 592 (1918); First
National Bank of Millburn v. Cahill, et at., 160 Atl. 649 (N. J. 1932).
' Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Wilmarth, et al., 252 N. W. 507 (Iowa
1934).
' BLACK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1927) 709. Referring to the
contracts clause, the author says, "But the prohibition is directed against the
legislative actions of the state (whether by the legislature or by a constitutional
convention) and not against the determinations of its judicial department."
"Johnson v. Funk, 132 Kan. 793, 297 Pac. 670 (1931) (Not only was the
price inadequate here, but it was merely nominal-four tracts of land sold for
$1 each); Griswold v. Bardon, 146 Wis. 35, 130 N. W. 952 (1911) (The addi-
tional ground here was failure to notify defendants of the sale). See also
Farmers' Life Ins. Co. v. Stegink, et al., 106 Kan. 730, 189 Pac. 965 (1920);
Gandy et al. v. Cameron State Bank, 2 S. W. (2) 971 (Tex. 1928).
" See Johnson v. Funk, supra note 13 and the language in Griswold v.
Bardon, supra note 13. In the latter case, the court, after stating the rule that
resale will not be granted for mere inadequacy of price, says it "must be
strictly confined to cases where there is absolutely no fact appearing, except
that the price is inadequate."
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of dicta 15 and decisions,'6 that there is discontent with the
present law as outlined above. The highest court of Wis-
consin 17 came out in open revolt and a lower court of
Missouri's has joined the opposition.
EARLY ATTITUDE OF SUPREME COURT TOWARDS M RATORY
LEGISLATION.
Early legislative efforts to champion the cause of the
mortgagor, threatened with ruin by one of the periodic finan-
cial slumps, were promptly discouraged by the Supreme
Court of the United States. A dictum in Bronson v. Kinzie 19
propagated a line of decisions adverse to the moratorium
statutes. 20  A bill for foreclosure was brought in a federal
court. After the execution of the mortgage, but before the
action had been commenced, Illinois passed a law giving a
twelve-month period of redemption and providing that no
'Dunlop v. Chenoweth, 90 N. J. Eq. 85, 105 Atl. 592 (1918) (the court
said that it would refuse to confirm the sale if the price were so inadequate as
to "shock the conscience"); Columbia Theological Seminary v. Arnette, 168
S. C. 272, 167 S. E. 465 (1932) (statement made that the court, in setting the
time for a foreclosure sale, can exercise an equity power to take into considera-
tion the present economic depression).
See infra notes 17, 18.
' Suring State Bank v. Giese, et al., 210 Wis. 489, 246 N. W. 556 (1933).
Original loan, $2,000. Property then worth over $2,000. Sold at foreclosure
sale for $600. Judicial notice is taken of the depression. That the value of
the land is only the dollars and cents obtainable on the market, shocks the
conscience of the court. Court of equity without aid of statute can do one of
three things: (1) Decline to confirm sale where the bid is substantially inade-
quate. Where inadeqfiacy of price resulted from mistake, misapprehension,
etc., courts have always refused to confirm. Inadequacy plus emergency should
give same result. (2) Fix upset price as courts do in case of foreclosure of
large corporate property, where competitive bidding is precluded by the size of
the property. (3) Court can conduct a hearing to establish the fair value of
the property and confirm the sale on condition that such value be credited on
the foreclosure judgment. If case (3) is adopted, plaintiff should be given
option to accept or reject. If he rejects, then new sale should be ordered.
' Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Sopluan, Circuit Ct. Mo., 4 M. Bar.
Jour. 55 (April). Case decided March, 1933. The decree was not identical
with that of the Suring State Bank case, mepra. note 17.
1914 U. S. 628, 11 L. ed. 143 (1843).
McCracken v. Hayward, 43 U. S.'608 (1844); Howard v. Bugbee, 65
U. S. 461 (1860) ; Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118, 16 Sup. Ct. 1042 (1895) ;
Burt v. Williams, 24 Ark. 91 (1863) ; Adams v. Spillyards 187 Ark. 641,
61 S. W. (2) 686, 86 A. L. R. 1523 (1933) ; First Nat. Bank v. Bovey, Shute
& Jackson, 49 N. D. 450, 191 N. W. 765 (1922) ; State ex rel. Cleveringa v.
Klim, 63 N. D. 396, 249 N. W. 116 (1933).
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sale or foreclosure shall be allowed unless two-thirds of the
value of the land, as determined by three householders, is
bid. The plaintiff moved for a sale to the highest bidder
regardless of the statute. The court, holding in his favor,
stated that the provisions as to redemption and evaluation
were unconstitutional. It then urged that while a change in
remedy is not itself a violation of the contracts clause, if it
is so drastic as to effect a change in right, as here, it is
invalid.2 ' In his dissenting opinioni, Justice McLean con-
siders the discussion of constitutionality unnecessary and
points out that state procedural law is to be applied in the
federal court only when adopted by rule of court. He says
that such a step had not been taken.22 But whether or not we
regard the declarations of the court as dicta, and whether or
not the application of the right-remedy tests is productive of
specious reasoning, 23 and whether or not there have been
sporadic state court decisions to the contrary, 24 the fact re-
mains that up to the time of the recent Blacsdell case, the
opinion in Bronson v. Kinzie has been definitive of the con-
stitutionality of mortgage moratoria. 25
It is interesting to observe at this point that cases have
arisen in the Supreme Court involving the question whether
a statute, passed after execution of the mortgage and before
the sale, changing the rights of the purchaser at foreclosure
violates the contracts clause. Where the purchaser is not
'The right remedy test for determining the application of Article I,
Section 10 of the Constitution has frequently been invoked. See cases supra
note 20; Johnson v. Higgins, 60 Ky. 566 (1861) ; Von Baumbach v. Bade, 9
Wis. 559, 76 Am. Dec. 283 (1859). For a decision which rejects this test in
favor of the one by which the validity of the law is made to depend on whether
the value of the contract is impaired by the change, see Edwards v. Kearzey,
96 U. S. 595, 24 L. ed. 793 (1877). Accord: Bank of Minden v. Clement, 256
U. S. 126, 41 Sup. Ct. 408 (1921). Neither of these tests is useful, nor are
they descriptive of the actual processes by which the courts reach their results.
For a discussion of the rights and remedies, see Llewellyn, A Realistic Juris-
prudence (1930) 30 COL. L. REv. 431.
'On the rule of court argument see also McCracken v. Hayward, supra
note 20, a case arising the year following on the same statute.
'A product of such reasoning is Johnson v. Higgins, 60 Ky. 566 (1861),
where civil operations of the courts were suspended for about seven months.
This was held constitutional since it merely affected the remedy.
"
4Johnson v. Higgins, supra note 23; Von Baumbach v. Bade, supra note
21; Blaisdell v. Home Building & Loan Assn., 189 Minn. 422, 249 N. W. 334
(1933) ; McCarty v. Prudence-Bonds Corp., 149 Misc. 13, 266 N. Y. Supp. 629
(1933); Chadwick v. Moore, 8 W. & S. 49 (Pa. 1844).
' Supra notes 4, 20.
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the mortgagee it is clear that as to him the statute is not
unconstitutional. 26  Where he was the mortgagee it has been
held that his contract rights were impaired.27  It is difficult
to approve of this result since the mortgagee acts in an
entirely different capacity when he buys at the sale. In the
latter capacity he had no subsisting contract to be impaired
at the time of the change in law. An earlier case so held.
28
The only possible justification for the later decision is that
the mortgagee is unfavorably affected by a subsequent law
which places additional burdens on the purchaser at fore-
closure sale and which therefore discourages prospective bid-
ders.29  But even under this approach the case must be con-
demned, for no great hardship was placed on the purchaser
by the new law. He was merely required to procure a deed
within a prescribed time. In any event, where the argument
does hold good, it is acceptable if the purchaser is mort-
gagee or not.
THE GROWTH OF POLICE POWER CONCEPT-THE RENT
CASES.
This, however, is but a variation of the main theme, to
which we now return. Although nearly a century elapsed
before any direct incursion 30 was made into the rule of
Bronson v. Kinzie, there was being developed during much
of that time a new tool with which to pry loose from their
'Hooker v. Burr, 194 U. S. 415, 24 Sup. Ct. 706 (1904). There was a
mortgage foreclosure and sale to plaintiff (an independent party). At the time
of execution of the mortgage, the law allowed redemption in six months at 2%
interest. After execution of the mortgage, but before sale, the law was changed
to twelve months at 1%. Defendant sheriff gave a deed to mortgagor's creditor,
who redeemed under the new law. Suit to set aside the deed. Held, for
defendant. Plaintiff not a party to an impaired contract. There was change of
law since his contract of purchase.
IBradley v. Tightrap, 195 U. S. 1, 24 Sup. Ct. 748 (1904). Codirt says
there is a distinction between case of purchase by mortgagee and case of
purchase by independent party having no connection with the original contract.
Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Cushman, 108 U. S. 51, 2 Sup.
Ct. 236 (1882).
2 This point was urged in Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Cush-
man, supra note 28, but rejected on the ground that such a contingency was too
remote to affect the value of the contract.
' Supra note 5.
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traditional rigidity many of the constitutional restraints.
The police power was at first of a narrow scope.31 By grad-
ual accretions it grew not only in the purposes for which it
could be exercised,3 2 but in the extent to which it could
expand to the exclusion of other rights. One such encroach-
ment was upon the contracts clause of the Constitution. 3
This latter development rendered possible the emergency
rent cases which, accepting economic stress as an occasion
for the further use of police power, cleared the way for recog-
nition of the validity of mortgage moratoria.
During the years immediately following the World War
a shortage of housing in certain localities caused consider-
able suffering. Legislative relief appeared in the form of
statutes providing, among other things, for reduced rentals
and holding over after the term upon reasonable payment
being made. In Bloch v. Hirsch 34 the constitutionality of
the District of Columbia statute was called in question by a
landlord who wished to re-enter at the expiration of the
term without complying with the stautory prescriptions.
Referring to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Mr. Justice Holmes used language expressive of the
court's attitude here and in other cases,35 which are more in
' See WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed.
1930) 761 et seq. The author very briefly traces the term police power from
its application to merely the residuary powers of the state to its use as a device
for fostering public welfare at the expense of private constitutional rights.
' "And it is also settled that the police power embraces regulations designed
to promote the public convenience or the general welfare and prosperity, as
well as those in the interest of the public health, morals, or safety." Pitney,
J., in Chicago & Alton R. R. v. Traubarger, 238 U. S. 67, 35 Sup. Ct. 678
(1914).,
Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473, 26 Sup. Ct. 127 (1905). Defendant
built a dam across stream. Plaintiff objected it interfered with his right of
passage and irrigation. Compromise reached and contract made by which
defendant was' to remove dam. State then passed a bill giving defendant
authority to erect another dam. This was for reclamation of swamp lands.
Bill for an injunction against maintenance of dam. Bill dismissed. Plaintiff
argued statute impaired the contract, therefore invalid. Police power "is para-
mount to any rights under contracts between individuals." This was a valid
exercise of police power. Though it does not come under health, lives, or
morals, it does come under general welfare. Accord: Union Dry Goods Co. v.
Georgia Public Service Corp., 248 U. S. 372, 39 Sup. Ct. 117 (1919) ; Producers
Transportation Co. v. Railroad Commission of the State of Cal., et al., 251
U. S. 228, 40 Sup. Ct. 131 (1920). Both these cases involve statutes regulating
public utilities and affecting former contracts.
' 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (1921).
' See infra notes 36, 37.
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point, involving state legislation. He said, "Plainly circum-
stances may so change in time or so differ in space as to
clothe with [public interest] what at other times or in other
places would be a matter of purely private concern." When
the New York statute came before the Supreme Court the
same year in Marcus Brown Holding Go. v. Feldman, et al.,3
a similar conception of the police power resulted in a
holding that the contracts clause was not violated. These
cases rest on the existence of an emergency, which the court
will notice even in the absence of legislative declaration,
although the latter will be given great weight.37 The consti-
tutionality of legislation depending for its validity on an
emergency is coextensive in time with the continuance of
the crisis.3
HOME BUILDING & LOAN ASSOCIATION v. BLAISDELL.
With this background at its disposal, with these legal
premises from which to draw, the Supreme Court on January
8, 1934, handed down its decision in Home Building & Loan
Association v. Blaisdell.9 After the mortgage in question
had been executed Minnesota passed a law 40 providing that
a court can extend the period of redemption up to May 1,
1935, and that during the extension the mortgagor shall pay
the reasonable rental value of the premises towards interest,
taxes, insurance, and the mortgage indebtedness. Plaintiff
petitioned for an order extending the redemption period. The
1256 U. S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct. 465 (1921). The court said, "* * * contracts
are made subject to this exercise of the power of the state, when otherwise
justified as we have held this to be." Re "otherwise justified" see Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 43 Sup. Ct. 158 (1922).
"Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U. S. 242, 42 Sup. Ct. 289 (1922). It
seems that a legislative factual investigation may influence the court to accept
as true the statutory declaration of emergency.
I Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543, 44 Sup. Ct. 405 (1924). Bill
in equity to enforce an order of the Rent Commission made under an act which
was passed after the expiration of the first rent act of Washington, D. C.,
renewing the latter and amending it. The second act declared an emergency to
still exist. Bill dismissed. Reversed. If the emergency no longer exists, the
law is no longer constitutional. If it were merely a question of court's knowl-
edge of conditions, the second act would be held bad.
Supra note 5.dO Minn. Laws 1933, c. 339, p. 514.
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court below held for the defendant, but was reversed by the
Supreme Court of the state.4 1 Judgment was then rendered
extending the period, determining the reasonable rental
value, and ordering payment thereof. This appeal to the
United States Supreme Court was taken from an affirmance
of the judgment in the highest court of the state. 42 Affirmed.
Chief Justice Hughes, in the majority opinion, stated, "While
emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish the
occasion for the exercise of power." He later says, "What-
ever doubt there may have been that the protective power of
the state, its police power, may be exercised-without violat-
ing the true intent of the provision of the Federal Consti-
tution-in directly preventing the immediate and literal
enforcement of contractual obligations by a temporary and
conditional restraint, where vital public interests would
otherwise suffer, was removed by our decisions relating to
the enforcement of provisions of leases during a period of
scarcity of housing." After reviewing a large number of
decisions the court says these criteria are established: 1. An
emergency existed which furnished a proper occasion fok the
exercise of police power. The fact of its existence is not
only judicially noticed by this court, but is declared by the
legislature and state court of Minnesota. 2. The relief
granted was reasonable. a. The mortgagor while remaining
in possession during the extension must pay the reasonable
rental value as determined by the courts. b. The law is not
for the advantage of particular individuals but for protec-
tion of society. Most mortgagees are insurance companies,
banks, mortgage companies, etc. which are not seeking homes
or farms. The law is for benefit of mortgagees as well as
mortgagors. c. The law provides for exercise of a power
which historically belonged to equity-the granting of a
period of redemption. Of course, a court may not alter the
statutory maximum period, but the law gives it some power
to vary the period within limits. 3. The legislation is tempo-
rary in operation and the court may change the period of
redemption as circumstances require.
"1789 Minn. 422, 249 N. W. 334 (1933).
"189 Minn. 448, 249 N. W. 893 (1933).
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IS THE NEW YORK STATUTE CONSTITUTIONAL?
What, then, can be said as to the validity of the New
York moratorium statute? 43 Home Building & Loan Asso-
"The following is a brief summary of its main provisions:
An Act to amend the C. P. A. in relation to foreclosure of
mortgages and actions for judgments on bonds secured by
mortgages (L. 1933, c. 793).
Section 1-Declaration of emergency.
Section 2-The C. P. A. is amended to read as follows:
Section 1077-a. Foreclosure for default in payment of principal is sus-
pended during the named emergency period. The act does not affect other
defaults authorizing foreclosure.
Section 1077-b. Suspends action on bond or other indebtedness contracted
simultaneously with and secured solely by a mortgage. Also suspends suits on
guaranty of such indebtedness.
Section 1077-c. A person who would, except for the foregoing provisions,
have a right to foreclose may make an application to the court and if it then
appears that the mortgaged property during six months before the application
produced a surplus over taxes, interest, and other carrying charges, the court
may order the payment of such surplus to past due principal. On failure to
make such payment or on failure to produce the necessary records, the court
may order foreclosure. This section shall not apply to farm property or
dwelling property occupied by the owner.
Section 1077-d. A waiver of 1077-a and b is void as against public policy.
Section 1077-e. 1077-a, b, and d shall apply to pending actions.
Section 1077-f. A proceeding in the scope of this act which would have
been maintainable at any time during the emergency, shall not be barred by
statute of limitations during one year after the end of the emergency.
Section 1077-g. This act not applicable to certain mortgages held by
savings and loan associations, nor to mortgages dated after July 1, 1932. The
period of emergency shall be from the date the act takes effect (Aug. 26,
1933) until July 1, 1934.
Section 3-If part of act is declared unconstitutional the rest shall not be
affected.
An Act to amend the C. P. A. in relation to deficiency
judgments and actions on bonds secured by mortgage on
realty (L. 1933, c. 794).
Section 1-Declaration of emergency.
Section 2-The C. P. A. is amended as follows:
Section 1083-a. No deficiency judgment shall be rendered except as herein
provided. On making motion to confirm sale the creditor may move for a
deficiency judgment upon notice to the other party. The court shall determine
the fair market value as of the time of sale. It shall enter a deficiency judg-
ment for the full judgment, plus prior liens, plus costs, minus the market value
of the property as determined by the court or the sale price, whichever shall
be higher.
Section 1083-b. In an action on an indebtedness secured by a mortgage
(simultaneously and solely), the defendant may set off the fair market value
of the premises less prior liens. In action to foreclose after the emergency a
deficiency judgment may be recovered in normal way, except for a deduction
for anything recovered as provided in this section.
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ciation. v. Blasdell does not open the door indiscriminately
to all legislation passed on the pretext of an emergency.43a
That the decision is not to function as a blanket approval of
all mortgage relief legislation has been indicated in judi-
cial 44 and academic circles.45 It might well be argued that
it does not even give sanction to all extensions of the redemp-
tion period. The payment of a reasonable rental by the
mortgagor during the prolongation has been suggested as a
requisite to constitutionality not only in the opinion but in
prior 41 and subsequent 47 cases. Implicitly conceding that
Section 3-If part of act declared unconstitutional, the rest shall not be
affected.
Section 4-The period of the emergency shall be from the date this act
takes effect (Aug. 28, 1933) until July 1, 1934. This act shall not apply to
any mortgage or indebtedness dated after July 1, 1932.
Recent cases interpreting the terms of the above legislation but not dealing
with the problem of constitutionality are: Joseph E. Marx Co., Inc. v. Hatton,
et al., - App. Div. -, 269 N. Y. Supp. 210 (2d Dept. 1934) ; Weisel v. Hagdal
Realty Co., Inc., 241 App. Div. 314, 271 N. Y. Supp. 629 (2d Dept.
1934); Loporto v. Druiss Co., Inc., 241 App. Div. 419, 273 N. Y. Supp. 11
(1st Dept. 1934); Cole v. Miller, et al., 150 Misc. 32, 268 N. Y. Supp. 443
(1934) ; Sherwin v. Jonas, 150 Misc. 342, 269 N. Y. Supp. 121 (1934).
"
3
aW. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, - U. S. -, 54 Sup. Ct. 816 (1934).
Debt contracted, judgment rendered for plaintiff, and life insurance policy
became payable to defendant before passage of a statute exempting proceeds of
life insurance policies from judicial process. After passage of the statute
plaintiff garnished the insurance proceeds. Defendant's motion to dismiss the
garnishment granted. Reversed. Chief Justice Hughes, who gave the opinion,
wrote, "The legislature sought to justify the exemption by reference to the
emergency which was found to exist. But the legislation was not limited to the
emergency and set up no conditions apposite to emergency relief." The Blais-
dell case was thus distinguished. The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Sutherland, who dissented in the mortgage case, denies that any distinction
is possible.
"Mathews, et al. v. Warner, Md. Circ. Ct. No. 2 of Baltimore, U. S. Law
Week, Apr. 3, 1934; State ex rel. Roth, Trustee v. Waterfield, 29 P. (2) 24
(Okla. 1934).
1 (1934) 22 CALIF. L. REv. 350.
", State ex rel. Cleverings v. Klein, 249 N. W. 118 (N. D. 1933). The
court distinguishes the rent cases, pointing out that there the landlords were
at least given reasonable rental value during the extension of the lease. Here,
during the period of redemption the purchaser gets nothing. As early as
1895, the Supreme Court in Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118, 16 Sup. Ct.
1042, said, in referring to a new redemption statute as applied to pre-existing
contracts, "What is sold under this act is not the estate pledged, * * * but a
remainder-an estate subject to the possession for 18 months, of another
person who is under no obligation to pay rent or account for profits." It is
not intimated that the courts at that date would have upheld the statute had it
provided for payment of rent, but the language is significant in the light of
later developments. See also the state court opinion in the Blaisdell case,
mtpra note 41.
'7 State ex rel. Roth, Trustee v. Waterfield, mtpra note 44. This case does
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the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court of the United
States is not to be construed as validating all moratoria, a
recent comment on that case in the Columbia Law Review 48
states that on the basis of the tests enumerated in the opinion
of Chief Justice Hughes the New York statute should be
upheld. The writer says, "In determining 'reasonableness'
in the much-discussed field of mortgage moratoria, the prin-
cipal case, as have other recent cases, stresses three factors
all of which are present in the rent cases: a discretionary
application of the statute by the courts, provision for the
payment of 'rent' during the moratorium, and a definite
limitation upon the duration of the moratorium. In view
of its provisions in this respect, the New York Mortgage
Moratorium Law, * * * appears within the permissible
limits."
While the New York courts have taken a friendly atti-
tude towards the statute,4 9 the conclusion reached in the
quotation just given should be closely scrutinized. As to the
first test enunciated, it is submitted that the author errs in
asserting that the New York statute complies with it. The
right to foreclose and to sue for principal default is sus-
pended in absolute terms.50 It is true that on request by
the mortgagee the court may, if earnings are sufficient, order
payment of part of principal and that in the event default
in such payment is made, foreclosure becomes possible.51
Whether this is such "discretionary application" as is
referred to remains a debatable question. In any event the
provision expressly exempts from its operation farm and
dwelling property, and as to these at least the requisite is
not fulfilled. The second test calls for payment of rent
not involve a redemption period, but rather an extension of time in which to
answer in a mortgage foreclosure suit. Nevertheless, one ground on which the
court distinguishes the Blaisdell case is that there the statute called for payment
of rental value.
"8(1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 361.
"In addition to the cases at the end of note 43 supra which assume the
constitutionality of the statute without discussing it, see McCarty v. Prudence-
Bond Corp., 149 Misc. 13, 266 N. Y. Supp. 629 (1933) (before the Blaisdell
case) and Matter of People (Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co.), 264 N. Y. 69,
190 N. E. 153 (1934) (after the Blaisdell case). The latter decision is not on
the statute under discussion, but on the related Schackno Act.
SN. Y. C. P. A. § 1077 a, b, supra note 43.
N. Y. C. P. A. §1077 c, supra note 43.
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during the moratorium. No, such item is to be found in the
statute under discussion. The third criterion, a definite limi-
tation upon the duration of the moratorium, is complied
with, but the more basic question arises as to whether it is
in fact a test. In the light of Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair,
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the emergency rent case in which the court considered itself
bound to prematurely terminate emergency legislation when
the critical conditions cease, it is difficult to see why a self-
limiting provision in the statute is essential. So far as the
cases indicate, the only purpose in requiring a limit on the
duration of the enactment is to prevent its operation after
the cessation of the emergency. Since it is the duty of the
court to determine the life of the statute, as stated in the
Chastleton case, it can never function after the emergency
whether or not the legislature defines the length of its exis-
tence. True, there is language in W. B. Worthen Co. v.
Thomas 52a which indicates a contrary conclusion, but the
discussion on the point in the opinion is purely gratuitous.
It is not likely that the court will deviate from the path of
logic to follow this dictum.5 2b
If the language of a recent New York Supreme Court
decision 53 can be taken seriously, an argument might be
made in favor of the validity of the deficiency judgment
clause 54 on the ground that the statute made no substantial
change in the law and hence no impairment of contract. Mr.
Justice Schmuck vacated a deficiency judgment, stressing the
"present dilemma in real estate" and "unusual conditions
working acknowledged harm." If the deficiency judgment
can be vacated, a fortiori, it can be granted on the conditions
prescribed by the new law. But the trouble with the argu-
ment is that New York took the traditional attitude,55 at
' See note 38 szpra.
"a "In the instant case the relief sought to be afforded is neither temporary
nor conditional." E. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, supra note 43a.
b Lehman, J., "Failure by the Legislature to limit the operations of the
law to a definite term does not render the law invalid so long as the conditions
which justify the passage of the law remain." Matter of People (Title and
Mortgage Guaranty Co.), supra note 49. See also (1934) 34 COL L. REv. 1134.
1 N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Johar Realty Corp., N. Y. Sup. Ct. Spec. 1,
Schmuck, J., N. Y. L. J., July 22, 1933, p. 259.
N. Y. C. P. A. §1083-a.
See the second paragraph of this paper and notes thereto. On the New
York Law see McGown v. Sanford, et al., 9 Paige 290 (N. Y. 1841) ; Whitbeck
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least prior to the statute, 5a towards relieving the mortgagor
from the effects of foreclosure because of particular hard-
ships resulting from a financial slump. Hence the deficiency
judgment could not properly be vacated on the grounds
quoted above. The case may be approved on its facts, since
there was, in addition to the hardship, inequitable conduct
on the part of the mortgagee in that he delayed procuring the
sale during a rapidly declining market.56  Such a view of the
case, of course, renders it valueless as a basis from which to
argue that there has been no substantial change in the law.
CONCLUSION.
The court, in the Blaisdell case, is not very clear as to
the force intended by it to be given to the tests enunciated.
Whether they are to be treated as necessary prerequisites
or merely as influencing factors remains open to doubt. Much
of the New York statute cannot stand if these criteria are to
be rigidly applied. While the recent tendency of the Supreme
Court towards liberality 5 (albeit of the five-to-four variety)
militates against the probability of such application, it is
unwarranted optimism to assume that the entire New York
Mortgage Moratorium law is made constitutional by Home
Building &f Loan Association v. Blaisdell.
MILTON H. FEINBERG.
New York City.
v. Rowe, 25 How. Pr. 403 (N. Y. 1862) ; McEwen v. Butts, et al., 65 Hun 624
(N. Y. 1892); Condert v. DeLogerot, 77 Hun 610 (N. Y. 1894); Housman v.
Wright, 50 App. Div. 606, 64 N. Y. Supp. 71 (2d Dept. 1900).
% Probably the law remains the same today, but some doubt is created by
Dry Dock Savings Institution v. Harriman, 150 Misc. 861, 271 N. Y. Supp. 604
(1934) and Monaghan v. May, 242 App. Div. 64, 273 N. Y. Supp. 475 (2d
Dept. 1934).
0' Billington v. Forbes, 10 Paige 487 (N. Y. 1843) (Inadequate price plus
inequitable conduct of a co-defendant. A fortiori, inequitable conduct of mort-
gagee will produce same result).
r See for example, Nebbia v. People of State of New York, 288 U. S. 594,
54 Sup. Ct. 505 (1934).
